The Twin Earth Chronicles: Twenty Years of Reflection on Hilary Putnam's the Meaning of Meaning
Language: en
Pages: 432
Authors: Andrew Pessin, Sanford Goldberg
Categories: History
Type: BOOK - Published: 2016-09-16 - Publisher: Routledge

In 1975, Putnam published a paper called The Meaning of 'Meaning', which challenged the orthodox view in the philosophies of language and mind. The article's Twin Earth conclusions about meaning, thought and knowledge were shocking. This work contains writings on the subject of Twin Earth.
The Twin Earth Chronicles
Language: en
Pages: 410
Authors: Andrew Pessin, Sanford Goldberg
Categories: Language and languages
Type: BOOK - Published: 1996 - Publisher: M.E. Sharpe

Books about The Twin Earth Chronicles
Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind
Language: en
Pages: 524
Authors: John-Michael Kuczynski
Categories: Philosophy
Type: BOOK - Published: 2007-08-23 - Publisher: John Benjamins Publishing

What is it to have a concept? What is it to make an inference? What is it to be rational? On the basis of recent developments in semantics, a number of authors have embraced answers to these questions that have radically counterintuitive consequences, for example: • One can rationally accept self-contradictory propositions (e.g. Smith is a composer and Smith is not a composer). • Psychological states are causally inert: beliefs and desires do nothing. • The mind cannot be understood in terms of folk-psychological concepts (e.g. belief, desire, intention). • One can have a single concept without having any others: an otherwise conceptless creature could grasp the concept of justice or of the number seven. • Thoughts are sentence-tokens, and thought-processes are driven by the syntactic, not the semantic, properties of those tokens. In the first half of Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind, John-Michael Kuczynski argues that these implausible but widely held views are direct consequences of a popular doctrine known as content-externalism, this being the view that the contents of one’s mental states are constitutively dependent on facts about the external world. Kuczynski shows that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between, on the one hand, what is literally meant by linguistic expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must work through to compute the literal meanings of such expressions. The second half of the present work concerns the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM). Underlying CTM is an acceptance of conceptual atomism – the view that a creature can have a single concept without having any others – and also an acceptance of the view that concepts are not descriptive (i.e. that one can have a concept of a thing without knowing of any description that is satisfied by that thing). Kuczynski shows that both views are false, one reason being that they presuppose the truth of content-externalism, another being that they are incompatible with the epistemological anti-foundationalism proven correct by Wilfred Sellars and Laurence Bonjour. Kuczynski also shows that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as “computation”, “syntax”, “algorithm” and “formal truth”; and he provides novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms. (Series A)
Empty Ideas
Language: en
Pages: 272
Authors: Peter Unger
Categories: Analysis (Philosophy)
Type: BOOK - Published: 2017-11 - Publisher: Oxford University Press

Peter Unger's provocative new book poses a serious challenge to contemporary analytic philosophy, arguing that to its detriment it focuses the predominance of its energy on "empty ideas." In the mid-twentieth century, philosophers generally agreed that, by contrast with science, philosophy should offer no substantial thoughts about the general nature of concrete reality. Leading philosophers were concerned with little more than the semantics of ordinary words. For example: Our word "perceives" differs from our word "believes" in that the first word is used more strictly than the second. While someone may be correct in saying "I believe there's a table before me" whether or not there is a table before her, she will be correct in saying "I perceive there's a table before me" only if there is a table there. Though just a parochial idea, whether or not it is correct does make a difference to how things are with concrete reality. In Unger's terms, it is a concretely substantial idea. Alongside each such parochial substantial idea, there is an analytic or conceptual thought, as with the thought that someone may believe there is a table before her whether or not there is one, but she will perceive there is a table before her only if there is a table there. Empty of import as to how things are with concrete reality, those thoughts are what Unger calls concretely empty ideas. It is widely assumed that, since about 1970, things had changed thanks to the advent of such thoughts as the content externalism championed by Hilary Putnam and Donald Davidson, various essentialist thoughts offered by Saul Kripke, and so on. Against that assumption, Unger argues that, with hardly any exceptions aside from David Lewis's theory of a plurality of concrete worlds, all of these recent offerings are concretely empty ideas. Except when offering parochial ideas, Peter Unger maintains that mainstream philosophy still offers hardly anything beyond concretely empty ideas.
Wittgenstein, Language and Information:
Language: en
Pages: 358
Authors: David Blair
Categories: Computers
Type: BOOK - Published: 2006-05-16 - Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

“The more narrowly we examine language, the sharper becomes the con?ict - tween it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation; it was a requirement. ) The con?ict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty. —We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk; so we need 1 friction. Back to the rough ground!” —Ludwig Wittgenstein This manuscript consists of four related parts: a brief overview of Wittgenstein’s p- losophy of language and its relevance to information systems; a detailed explanation of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy of language and mind; an extended discussion of the re- vance of his philosophy to understanding some of the problems inherent in information systems, especially those systems which rely on retrieval based on some representation of the intellectual content of that information. And, fourthly, a series of detailed footnotes which cite the sources of the numerous quotations and provide some discussion of the related issues that the text inspires. The ?rst three of these parts can each be read by itself with some pro?t, although they are related and do form a conceptual whole.